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I INTRODUCTION
Governance signifies a recognition of the existence of a complex civil soci­
ety and the magnitude of its impact on the process of urban development
(McCarney et al. 1995:129).
“Conquering the Beast” was the title of a recent article in the Egyptian 
newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly (December 2-8, 1999:6), an interview with 
the Governor of Cairo, Abdel-Rehim Shehata. In the interview, he states, 
“Cairo is the city of problems,” although he is also quick to declare that 
“our strategy is an all-out attack on those problems” (ibid.). The Governor 
describes the comprehensive plan formulated by the governorate' to deal 
with Cairo’s infrastructure, cleanliness, traffic, water and air pollution, and 
cultural and human development, and emphasizes that “the most danger­
ous obstacle we are up against is people’s behavior. No matter how much 
we do, without deep-rooted changes in society’s attitude, all our efforts 
will be short-changed, and we will have little to show for them (ibid.:7). 
He adds, “People do not like to listen to the government... I don’t know 
why. Old habits, I guess. They seem to doubt that the government is here 
to serve their needs” (ibid.:6). According to the Governor, this is why traf­
fic congestion, crowded streets, dirty neighborhoods, polluted air and sim­
ilar problems persist. “The problem he continues, is that many of Cairo s 
inhabitants lack a feeling of belonging. Many do not come originally from 
the city; they are either recently-arrived migrants ot in transit. This is a big 
problem. You have to try and develop people’s sense of belonging” 
(ibid.:6). He emphasizes that if his strategy is fully implemented and “if 
people can change their behavior, then we will be one of the most beauti­
ful capitals in the world” (ibid.:7).
One often encounters remarks like these about Cairo residents in the 
Egyptian public discourse, conveying a general feeling about people’s prac­
tices and roles in the making of the city. They are usually invoked to 
rationalize the persistence of the city’s problems but rarely to celebrate
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people as the source of the city’s vitality. This intetview also illustrates that 
government officials still think of city management as a top-down endeav­
or: The government, its planners, and officials do the planning and the 
people should follow their regulations. There is little room in the 
Governor’s view for dialogue between the government and the people or 
for people’s participation. This interview recalls the fantasy of many plan­
ners and policymakers who have dreamed since the last century of con­
trolling the city, its processes, and growth. From Haussmann, Le 
Corbusier, and Robert Moses to the current Governor of Cairo, the vision 
of the city continues to be largely linked to rational planning, technolog­
ical progress, and a “sweeping, rational engineering of all aspects of social 
life...” (Scott 1998:88). Despite strong criticism by sociologists (Jacobs 
1961; De Certeau 1988), anthropologists (Holston 1989), and political 
scientists (Scott 1998), the dream is still alive and well: If only we could 
implement our well-designed comprehensive strategies, and if only people 
would obey what we tell them, then all of the city’s problems would be 
solved and everyone would live happily ever after. They still view laws 
formulated and enforced by government officials as the main ingredient 
for a vital and beautiful city. As Cairo’s Governor declares confidently, 
“there is no street in Cairo, even in the desert areas, which is not an open 
book to us— Our only life buoy is law and order” {Al-Ahram Weekly 
December 2—8, 1999:7).
In contrast, the notion of urban governance tries to account for the 
multiple actors and groups that shape urban life and does not assume that 
people are obstacles to urban development. Scholars have used this con­
cept in recent years to analyze the relationship between “citizens” and their 
“city state” (McCarney 1996). Its focus is the struggle over urban resources 
and services, which is becoming more central to urban development with 
the increasing inability of some governments to meet the demands of their 
cities’ growing populations. As a concept, urban governance promises to 
replace the “management/delivery model [with] an access/demand 
model—two very different approaches, the former being top-down and 
the latter more bottom-up” (McCarney et al. 1995:106). It entails a “shift 
from a noun (government) to a verb (governance), from structure to 
process, from things to relations...” (Swilling 1997:3). More importantly, 
governance promises to enable us to understand urban struggles without 
“a pre-determination of the locus of power,” and to expand urban devel­
opment to include the groups and agents that are active in the formation 
of the city but that were previously excluded conceptually, and often
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politically (McCarney et al. 1995:99).
This article discusses urban governance in capital cities and draws upon 
my work with the Middle East sub-regional network of the Global Urban 
Research Initiative (GURI) in Cairo from January to July 1997. Using the 
example of Cairo, I raise some methodological and conceptual issues relat­
ed to the analysis of governance in cities in general and in capital cities in 
particular. I emphasize the specificity of capital cities, especially in indus­
trializing countries, in any attempt to understand the struggles over and 
the management of urban resources.
GURI researchers have been pioneers in introducing the concept of 
urban governance to the development and research communities.^ Since 
1993, researchers associated with GURI have published several studies 
presenting innovative insights into the various actors who participate in 
urban development. The concept of urban governance presented in these 
studies, which have been conducted throughout the developing world, 
promises to capture the complexity of interactions between state and soci­
ety. As latecomers to GURI, the Middle East sub-regional network missed 
the chance to participate in the challenging process of conceptualizing the 
notion of urban governance. We, however, benefited from previous efforts 
and had the luxury to reflect on the literature produced by researchers in 
the global network while initiating comparative research in several Middle 
Eastern cities, including Cairo.
This article focuses on our experience in understanding governance as 
an analytical concept. First, I argue that capital cities have their own char­
acteristics that must be considered when studying governance. In the sec­
ond section, I review some methodological and conceptual issues related 
to understanding the multiplicity of actors in Cairo. The discussion focus­
es on part of the complex articulation between national and local struc­
tures in a particular low-income neighborhood in Cairo. Then, I move to 
discuss the emphasis that the urban development and urban governance 
literature places on collective action. In the last section, I present some 
critical comments on the tendency in the literature to slip between using 
governance as an analytical tool and as a tool for change. That section focus­
es on the notion of “good” governance and asks how it may be possible to 
move from governance of the Capital (with a capital C to indicate that min­
isters, government planners, and policymakers make key decisions) to gov­
ernance in the capital (with a small c to signify that a wider range of agents 
participate in formulating policies, managing the city, and providing 
urban services).
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II URBAN governance: the case of capital cities
As an analytical concept, urban governance has been used in the GURI lit­
erature to mean a number of things. For some authors, it is “shared or par­
ticipatory management” (Attahi 1997:198) while for others, governance 
“captures the totality of state-society dynamics” (Halfani 1997b:119). 
One author defines it as “the realm of relations between and within orga­
nizational forms...operating at the local level in urban areas” (Swilling 
1997:11), while another argues that governance “embrace[s] the manner 
in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic 
and social resources for development” (Onibokun 1997:97). With such 
diversity in meaning, we began with a basic, broad definition of gover­
nance. Thus, this article traces our efforts to understand governance as 
“the relationship between civil society and the state, between rulers and the 
ruled, the government and governed” (McCarney et al. 1995:95, empha­
sis in the original). This broad definition established a common ground 
among members of the network from which to address similar questions, 
yet permitted them the flexibility to examine issues specific to the differ­
ent capital cities we studied.
While the various GURI studies have placed governance at the center 
of analysis, “urban” often remains a taken-for-granted concept that is 
rarely problematized, and is equated with “local.” As Shami argues, “the 
qualifier ‘urban appears to be used as a synonym for local, which in turn 
is simply seen as a bounded space which is the city” (Forthcoming:3). In 
this regard, the urban governance scholars could benefit from a dialogue 
with scholars in the social sciences. Anthropologists, for example, have 
been active since the early 1930s in the study of cities, in both Western 
and non-Western settings. While their attention originally focused on 
urban poverty, rural-urban migration, bounded communities, “urban vil­
lages,” and ethnic enclaves, urban anthropologists have broadened the 
scope of their studies over the years to include a wide range of urban 
processes and practices. Urban politics and grassroots movements in par- 
ticulat have been central to urban anthropology since the mid-1960s. 
Since the 1970s, urban anthropology has also encompassed not only stud­
ies in the city (that is, the city as a mere container for studying topics like 
kinship, gender, poverty, and ethnicity) but also studies t^the city (in 
which the problematic of urban became central to the examination of var­
ious topics and processes). During the 1960s and 1970s, the notion of 
urban became the focus of discussion; many scholars attempted to define
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and redefine the concept (see Eames and Goode 1977). While space here 
does not permit a summary of the debates on concepts like urban, urban­
ism, and urbanization (see Fox 1977), it is sufficient to emphasize the 
need to think critically about the meaning(s) we attach to “urban” when 
discussing urban governance. We should try to avoid using it as a totaliz­
ing concept that suppresses variations and ignores diverse historical and 
contemporary junctures. It is important to ask questions such as: What are 
the processes, forms, and power structures that we identify with urban 
governance versus (other forms of) governance? Are we limiting the con­
cept of utbanism to the entity that we call the city? That is, are we direct­
ly or indirectly reproducing the dichotomy between the urban and the 
rural? Are cities separate from the countryside, or are they “simply parts an 
overall urban space” (Miles et al. 2000:1)? How would the picture be dif­
ferent if we approached urban governance by focusing on variations 
between cities rather than by dividing the globe into Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, and so on?
Conducting research in capital cities provides a good opportunity to 
think about governance in concrete and complex ways. It allows us to 
examine the urban dimension without homogenizing all cities under the 
same notion and directs our attention to the specificity of various urban 
centers. In this effort, ethnography and anthropological methods (such as 
participant observation, interviews, oral histories, and narratives) are espe­
cially productive. Ethnography directs our attention to the daily struggles 
and the continuous negotiations that make and remake cities and their 
spaces. It also grounds our understanding of urban dynamics in concrete 
realities and historical changes that enrich our understanding of gover­
nance in general and urban governance in particular. Anthropology is also 
powerful in informing our understanding of urban politics not only as 
centered on the provision of services and access to material resources. 
Urban politics is also linked in significant ways to identity and solidarity 
within the city and to national and transnational connections between 
cities (see Sanjek 1990 and Low 1996 for a review of urban anthropology 
literature in the 1980s and 1990s). This is especially the case in capital 
cities, where the identity of the city and its residents is often central to the 
struggle between the state and numerous social groups. Drawing on these 
insights, I will focus on Cairo to elaborate some issues related to capital 
cities and the challenges they pose for the analysis and operationalization 
of urban governance.
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III CAPITAL CITIES: THE CASE OF CAIRO
As the capital of Egypt for more than one thousand years, Cairo’s 
supremacy is clear; it is the obvious political, economic, and cultural cen­
ter of Egypt.^ This centrality is clearly manifested in the fact that many 
people use the Arabic name for Egypt, Misr, to refer to Cairo, along with 
its Arabic name, al-Qahira (“The Victorious”). Over the years, Cairo has 
attracted a large number of migrants from the countryside and from other 
cities. Containing one-quarter of Egypt’s population, almost 8 million in 
the city proper {Al-Ahram December 2—8, 1999:7) and almost 16 
million in in the metropolitan area according to the latest census {Al- 
Ahram Weekly Augxxst 31-September 6, 2000:2), it is by far the largest city 
in the country. At the same time, as is the case with many other capital 
cities, Cairo plays a central role in linking Egypt with the rest of the world. 
Promoting the national economy and furthering the interaction with the 
international community require new office towers, luxury housing, and 
improved infrastructure.
The increasing globalization of Cairo provides new possibilities for the 
capital, its administration, and residents, such as more job opportunities 
and advances in communications. However, it can also create new bur­
dens. The demands of Cairo’s growing population, investors, and tourists 
have put tremendous pressure on the city’s resources and services. This has 
resulted in many problems such as housing shortages, deteriorating sewage 
systems, increasing pollution, and the growing inefficiency of the trans­
portation network.
Capital cities are often heavily invested with national pride and sym­
bolic value, as the different papets in this volume illustrate, most notably 
those on Jerusalem and Beirut. At the same time, the strong link between 
the image of the capital and the image of the nation shapes the policies that 
aim to restructure the urban scene, especially in city centers (Ghannam 
1997). In Cairo, this includes expecting certain groups (especially low- 
income groups) to sacrifice for the good of the nation (ibid.). For example, 
in 1979-1981, the state public discourse used Cairo’s status as the capital 
to legitimize the relocation of thousands of low-income families from the 
city center to other neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city. The inter­
ests of the whole nation and the importance of constructing a modern 
image of Cairo were depicted as more important than the interests of the 
relocated groups. Resistance to the project was portrayed as selfish.
The significance of the city’s image is also used to legitimize the actions
RESEARCHING URBAN GOVERNANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 39
of certain groups, especially the powerful, and to dismiss the efforts of 
other groups to be part of the physical, social, and political fabric of the 
city. The history of the city is also appropriated selectively to assert the 
rights of certain groups while excluding other groups and sites. While, for 
example, the projects of the elite are often portrayed as contributions to 
the beauty and development of the city, the housing units, small shops, 
and peddler carts of low-income groups are depicted as eye sores and can­
cer cells that have to be destroyed (Ghannam 1999).
The location of all of the ministries, government offices, and embassies 
in Cairo places contradictory demands on the city. At the same time, over­
lapping responsibilities between governmental bodies (especially between 
the governorate and the ministries) create “contradictions and ambigui­
ties” about who should provide what services and where (MQM 
1993:261). As several intellectuals stated at a conference in 1997, “we do 
not know who is running Cairo any more.”“ Many scholars at the confer­
ence noted that the lack of coordination and conflicting responsibilities 
are behind Cairo’s problems and their inefficient resolution. A piece of 
land, for example, can be under the jurisdiction of the Ministries of 
Housing and Reconstruction, Religious Endowments, Tourism, 
Agriculture, or Defense, and the Governorate of Cairo, all at the same 
time {Al-Ahram August 20, 1997:3). In fact, some scholars argue that 
ministries are the first to violate land use laws (Abu-Lughod 1990). In 
many cases, disputes between ministries lead to confusion over the prop­
er use of land and exacerbate inefficiency in delivering services.
Similarly, despite its unique roles and problems, Cairo is still governed 
by the same laws and regulations as other Egyptian cities. Eor example, the 
capital is part of Greater Cairo, which includes two other governorates, 
Giza and Qalubiya. However, no metropolitan authority exists to coordi­
nate the services and resources shared by these entities. The lack of “effec­
tive coordination” between the cities and governorates that form Greater 
Cairo is seen as one of the major problems facing Cairo, especially when 
it comes to addressing environmental problems and services, like trans­
portation and pollution, that extend over the three governorates (MQM 
1993:262).
National concerns often take priority over the interests of local groups 
(Arandel and El-Batran 1996), and the development of the city’s infra­
structure depends on the national government (Denis 1997). Thus, the 
Prime Minister can issue laws and decrees to regulate and control various 
services in Cairo. In addition, the the President appoints the Governor of
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Cairo; the Governor’s power depends largely on his/her abilities and skills, 
because he/she is often restricted by the “dual control principle” (Mayfield 
1996:89). This arrangement assigns representatives of the ministries to the 
Governorate Executive Council. However, because they are linked profes­
sionally and technically to their ministries, the Governor has only “admin­
istrative and some operational power” over them (Mayfield 1996:89). In 
short, Cairo’s Governor represents the national government and its inter­
ests and plays a role often limited to “the supervision of the implementa­
tion of the general governmental policy” (UNCHS—Habitat 1993:117).
Paradoxically, the presence of ministries in Cairo often places localized 
demands and national needs in opposition. The activities of many parlia­
mentary representatives to the People’s Assembly exemplify these compet­
ing demands. These representatives, called “services representatives” 
(nuwwab khadamai) in the Egyptian and Arab media, pay more attention 
to the private requests of their constituents than to discussing laws and 
questioning the government’s policies {Al-Wasat March 2, 1998:30). 
Many representatives are pre-occupied with meeting the needs of their 
constituents, visiting ministries throughout Cairo to address their prob­
lems. One representative stated that he works on almost 400 requests each 
week and that he is often forced to visit ministers in their offices to solve 
difficult issues. It has been argued in the People’s Assembly and local news­
papers that this phenomenon explains the frequent absence of a quorum 
of Assembly members. On two occasions, for example, the head of the 
Assembly has had to cancel legislative sessions because many representa­
tives had left the Assembly after signing in, leaving the Assembly without 
a quorum. Thus, representatives often neglect their national duties in 
favor of individual and collective requests from their constituents.
The state’s concern with controlling the capital and its residents includes 
a strong grip over the provision of basic services and a top-down approach 
to urban development and resources. The government’s actions in after- 
math of the 1992 earthquake exemplified this grip; the government issued 
a military decree that prevented any organization from providing support 
directly to citizens and requested that all aid be channeled through its own 
agencies. Although the government is not the only actor in Cairo, its central 
role in the organization and management of the city is decisive. Therefore, 
an important question is: What are the structures that run Cairo and plan 
urban development projects? This question and the other points discussed 
above were central to our research in Cairo and our exploration of stake­
holders in one neighborhood in the district of Sayeda Zeinab.
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IV STUDYING URBAN GOVERNANCE IN CAIRO
The Cairo research team approached urban governance by studying the 
role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in shaping the urban 
environment. We examined the Near East Foundation (NEF) and its 
related organization, the Center for Development Setvices (CDS), as 
urban actors in Cairo, to determine how their involvement in an urban 
project shapes not only the local community but also the organization 
itself and its engagement in urban areas. As described by Kamal and El- 
Karanshawy (this volume), our focus was on an NEF/CDS garbage removal 
project that involved the use of Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) for 
community mobilization and collaboration with other Egyptian NGOs in 
a neighborhood of Sayeda Zeinab.
After reviewing the documents and repotts produced by NEF/CDS on 
the project, we found it important to contextualize the documentation by 
examining the broader context. For this purpose, we cooperated with a 
political scientist to increase our understanding of Cairo’s complex admin­
istrative system (Rady 1997). This was necessary to explore how a single 
neighborhood is linked with larger units, such as the district, the quarter, 
and the governorate, as well as how these larger units link up with min­
istries and other national bodies.
In addition to exploring the structures and agencies that make and 
implement policies in Cairo, we also investigated how the people of the 
neighborhood relate to these structures. A sociologist helped us to gain in- 
depth information on residents’ daily lives and how they interact with 
local councils and officials within the area and outside it (Hakem 1997). 
This aspect of our research addressed questions such as: How do social 
actors negotiate access to resoutces and services? Who mediates the rela­
tionship between the state and civil society? What are the roles of net­
works and family ties in urban development?
The Neighborhood versus Cairo
Fifteen neighborhoods (sing, shiakha) form the district (sing, qisrn) of 
Sayeda Zeinab.^ The latter is part of a larger administrative unit called the 
quarter (sing, hayf), which is the main unit for providing and managing 
services. Each quarter has a main, appointed executive council that is 
directly linked to the Governorate of Cairo. I will not attempt to explain 
the complex interaction between this council and the various bodies that 
manage Cairo (for more on this, see UNCHS—Habitat 1993). Suffice it to
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say that most decisions related to Cairo are made by the President, the 
Prime Minister, Ministers, and other appointed officials. Another notable 
feature is the hierarchical structure, which “assumes that lower-level exec­
utive council officials are completely...subordinate to the control of the 
members at a higher level” (Mayfield 1996:79). There is a top-down 
movement of orders, policies, and information with little communication 
from the bottom of the structure to the top (See Figures 1.1, 1.2).
The quarter is also represented in the Local People’s Council at the level 
of the quarter and the governorate. At the governorate level, Sayeda 
Zeinab is represented by 10 members on this council, five of whom are 
from the project neighborhood. The Local People’s Council in each quar­
ter is elected but has limited power to run the affairs of the quarter. Of the 
12 members on the Local People’s Council in Sayeda Zeinab, five are from 
the project neighborhood. While these numbers suggest that representa­
tives from the project neighborhood play an important role in city coun­
cils, the role of the elected councils is restricted to supervising and scruti­
nizing the implementation of policies formulated by the central govern­
ment. However, even when the law grants the local councils the authority 
to supervise, this “supervision is more theoretical than practical” (Mayfield 
1996:113); the task is often taken over by appointed officials. The power 
of the members of the elected councils depends largely on their skills and 
connections with the central government, which enable them to mobilize 
resources and provide services. This makes it important to examine how 
elected and appointed officials negotiate the laws and regulations of the 
central power and how they interact with national ministries and other 
governmental bodies.
Profile of Civil Society
The articulation of the relationship between people in the project neigh­
borhood and officials inside and outside of it is also shaped by the histo­
ry and location of the neighborhood. The role of kinship, for example, is 
very important in obtaining access to resources and services. The oral his­
tory of the neighborhood indicates that a number of related families began 
migrating into the area from the countryside at the end of the 19th cen­
tury. Many of them were in butchering and the meat trade, which pro­
vided them with wealth and subsequently with local power. More recent­
ly, the big merchants started giving importance to education and govern­
ment jobs. For example, they strategically seek to have their children 
employed in the police force and organize themselves to control the local
FIGURE i.i Organizational structure of Cairo governorate, November 1990 (source: UNCHS, 1993. Reprinted with permission).
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FIGURE 1.2 Organizational structure of West Cairo urban quarter, November 1990 (source: UNCHS, 1993. Reprinted with permission).
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councils. The merchants also support the ruling party, the National 
Democratic Party, in the elections for the People’s Assembly to strengthen 
their relationship with the central government. These strategies are impor­
tant to protect the interests of the merchants and their relatives as well as 
to cultivate connections that are useful for the community at large.
Despite the fact that the neighborhood is now heterogeneous in terms 
of its residents’ economic activities, common strategies seem to link all of 
them to the central power. There are multiple mediators who privatize not 
the urban services, which are still largely controlled by the central govern­
ment, but the access to them. Other groups in the neighborhood, like the 
peddlers, ally themselves with big merchants (especially with meat whole­
salers) and use the merchants’ connections to deal with government offi­
cials. They need the mediation of the merchants and their children who 
are employed by the government to contend with continual threats from 
the police to fine them and confiscate their goods. Similarly, low-level civil 
servants in the area need the help of big merchants and their connections 
to assure that their children find jobs and housing, two scarce resources in 
the neighborhood and in Cairo as a whole. In return, both the peddlers 
and the low-level civil servants support the big merchants and their allies 
in local and national elections.
Although there are some local formal associations, informal networks 
are often more effective in daily struggles over services and resources. 
These networks bring together the different social groups in the area itself 
and connect the most powerful to city administrators and national politi­
cians. It is through these networks that permits for shops are obtained, 
fines for violations of city laws are reduced or forgiven entirely, and sup­
port for poor families is secured. These connections, however, remain 
unequally distributed. Rather than equal access, a hierarchy structures the 
access of men and women from different socioeconomic strata to local, 
city, and national actors.
For all the groups in the neighborhood, election times are excellent 
opportunities to negotiate over services and resources. This is true in local 
council elections as well as in elections for the People’s Assembly. Members 
of the Assembly often form NGOs and initiate projects in their election 
districts. Their strategy for gaining support is largely based on presenting 
themselves as service providers, that is, as a necessary link to the urban 
resources and services controlled by the state. As noted above, representa­
tives to the People’s Assembly derive a major portion of their popularity 
from their roles as mediators between national and local actors.
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Inequality is manifested both in the access to officials and resources and 
through the values attached to the actions of different social groups. As 
previously noted, while discourses of the state and the media often cele­
brate the actions of the elite as contributing to the development and mod­
ernization of the city, they depict the actions of low-income groups in neg­
ative terms. This brings to the forefront a main paradox, mentioned by the 
Governor of Cairo in the interview discussed above. If people try to take 
an active role in the shaping of their urban environment (by building 
houses, for example) and in securing income for their families (through 
vending and other so-called informal activities), their activities are depict­
ed as criminal and the source of social disorder. Yet, if people do not 
undertake such initiatives, they are labeled as lazy and passive and become 
targets of mobilization activities. Other paradoxes appear in the literature 
on urban governance. For example, McCarney and her colleagues assume 
that “urban residents in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have evolved (in 
many cases) from being passive subjects of their ruling states into more 
organized communities who have managed to expand their social and eco­
nomic space” (1995:101). McCarney also argues that “for effective partic­
ipation, there is also a need for their empowerment.... They must be 
organized and empowered in order to seek access and participate fully in 
decisions by the state” (McCarney 1995:258). Space does not permit me 
to question the validity of the first point, in particular the idea that city 
dwellers were ever “passive subjects and that peoples participation in the 
formation of the city is new. However, I would like to emphasize the need 
to think critically about the emphasis placed on “community” and “organ­
ized” action. As Shami (Forthcoming) notes, it is especially important to 
question these concepts in light of the growing understanding of links 
between knowledge and action, and of the role of research in promoting 
people’s participation and empowerment.
The development community tends to essentialize and legitimize certain 
forms of collective action while disregarding others. Thus, “community 
activism,” “social movements,” and “mass protests” are celebrated while 
other actions are considered “informal, individualistic, and opportunistic 
(Bayat 1997:5). Collective action is celebrated only when it becomes for­
malized (that is, when it becomes part of civic associations, NGOs, social 
movements, or community organizations), because these are assumed to 
have transcended “primordial associations which characterized urban 
dwellers in the 1960s, especially in Africa” (McCarney et al. 1995:102). 
McCarney et al. (ibid.) describe the new organizations as follows:
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The genesis of these institutions within the body of the civil society and the 
unstructured nature of their operations (in the conventional bureaucratic 
sense) reinforces an organic linkage with the communities and procures a 
high degree of legitimacy, commitment, and effectiveness.
Although not formalized, the actions of many Cairo residents, labelled 
“illegal” by planners and policymakers, are no less organic or effective than 
the activities of an NGO or another community-based organization.
In fact, some scholars suggest that more formalized groups, like private 
voluntary organizations (PVOs), are less successful than the informal net­
works that are central in the daily lives of many Cairo residents (see for 
example, Singerman 1995). PVOs in Egypt, usually initiated by middle- 
and upper-middle-class people, “often start with marked enthusiasm, then 
they level off, and finally they decline but rarely die. Thus many of Egypt’s 
PVOs become empty shells by the end of the cycle” (Ibrahim 1996:227). 
Considering the numerous official restrictions placed on NGOs in Egypt 
(see El-Karanshawy, this volume), the flexibility of informal networks 
becomes even more important.
V CONCLUSION: IMAGINING “gOOD GOVERNANCE”
The ‘completeness’ of the city is not to be located somewhere between 
totalizing integration and individual manipulation. Rather, cities are con­
tinuously made and remade through discursive and material disjunctures in 
the consumption of space, in the definition of boundaries, and in compet­
ing visions of the good city, the good life, and the public good. These are 
what make a space into a city in its completely incomplete sense (Shami
1996:49).
McCarney et al. (1995:101) argue that “governance requires capturing an 
integrated profile of the city in terms of its structural parts, as well as its 
actors and activities operating within the total complex.” Our research in 
Cairo points to the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of comprehending 
the city as a totality or an integrated whole. It underscores the need to 
examine specific localities to understand the interaction between national 
and local authorities on the one hand and between these authorities and 
other local actors on the other hand. In the same city, there are neighbor­
hoods in the center and others in the periphery, old and new areas, upper 
class and poor areas, all of which are articulated differently with the state’s
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structures. To be effective as an analytical tool, the concept of governance 
should be sensitive to such differences and inequalities. Poverty is a chal­
lenge that faces many nations (see Mabogunje 1997 for more on gover­
nance and poverty); the access of the urban poor to information, educa­
tion, and economic resources is typically restricted, and they are often dis­
advantaged in securing connections with local officials. Gender and age 
inequalities are also central to an adequate conceptualization of the rela­
tionship between the state and city dwellers. Despite the fact that women 
are highly underrepresented in the governmental agencies that run Cairo 
and often excluded from the planning and provision of urban services, 
they are key mediators between the family and the Egyptian bureaucracy 
and are central in securing resources for their families (see Ghannam 
1997; Singerman 1995; Early 1993).
The notion of urban governance is most productive when it directs our 
attention to the relationships among the multiple actors who shape the 
city and struggle over resources. It is most powerful in describing and ana­
lyzing the interaction between state and social groups. This concept is 
especially useful in understanding how global, national, and local eco­
nomic and political changes, such as structural adjustment and rapid 
urbanization, make it more difficult for national governments to meet the 
growing demands of the users of cities. To face the challenges of urban 
development and productivity under these conditions, the development 
community and international donors have highlighted the roles of NGOs, 
community-based organizations, and other associational groups. This 
interest in empowering local actors highlights a shift in the development 
circles from providing services to the poor during the 1970s and urban 
management in the 1980s to strengthening local governments and creat­
ing “good governance” in the 1990s (McGarney 1996:13).
I would argue, however, that its use is weakened by the tendency to 
shift between using urban governance as an analytical concept, which seeks 
to describe an existing set of relationships, and using it as a tool for change, 
which aims to “reinvent” (Rodriguez and Winchester 1996) reality. 
Translating the concept of urban governance into other languages clearly 
illustrates the different connotations and values embedded in the concept. 
In the regional MENA meeting held in Cairo in 1997, Mostafa Kharoufi 
noted that researchers in the GURI sub-region in North Africa translated 
governance into Arabic as tadbir rashid, meaning rational or intelligent 
management. For some authors, urban governance “implies both a robust 
civil society, with democratic rules protecting the public realm, and
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political-administrative decentralization” (Coelho 1996:42). For others, 
there is a growing emphasis on the need to replace the “bad governance” 
(Swilling 1997:4; Kharoufi 1997:38) that plagues many cities with “good,” 
“democratic” (Swilling 1997:7), or “effective” governance (McCarney et al. 
1995:124). “Good governance” implies “legitimacy in the relations between 
civil society and the state” and “depends on the ability of civic groups and 
individuals to participate fully in economic and political decisionmaking 
by the state” (McCarney 1995:258). To achieve good governance, other 
values and relationships, such as trust, reciprocity (Swilling 1997; Onibokun 
1997; Attahi 1997), accountability, responsiveness, transparency, legiti­
macy, participation, and empowerment (McCarney 1995; Halfani 1997b) 
must be introduced.
Conceptually these notions indicate an important shift from what I call 
governance t^cities, in which planning and decisionmaking are monopo­
lized by the central government, into governance in cities, in which vari­
ous stakeholders are included in formulating and implementing policies. 
However, this is also a shift from describing relationships between the state 
and the people into prescribing^, wide set of changes. The discussion of the 
elements of good governance is often vague and omits the fact that their 
meanings are contested in many societies. In addition, the literature leaves 
many questions to be answered, especially when it comes to a centralized 
capital like Cairo. How can we promote participation and empower local 
groups? How do we decide which groups to empower? How can we 
achieve the shift in the power structure and allocation of resources that 
good governance requires? How can we convince the central state (includ­
ing the Governor of Cairo) that it is advantageous to strengthen civil soci­
ety and local governments?
More important than processual and procedural questions, however, 
the emphasis on good governance and its prescriptive tendencies poses the 
danger of turning it into a master narrative that proceeds not from the 
reality of a given society but from a predetermined view of a desired end 
point. How can we avoid turning urban governance into a meta-narrative 
that, like development and modernization, is both loaded with values and 
demands a total transformation of society? How can we refine this concept 
to strengthen its emphasis on the multiplicity of actors and power struc­
tures that shape urban life, but without prescribing a set of universal 
changes? What kind of knowledge should we produce to better conceptu­
alize and operationalize the notion of urban governance?
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Notes
1. Egypt is divided administratively into 26 provinces, called governorates.
2. For a general discussion of the literature on governance, see Majdalani, this 
volume.
3. See Abu-Lughod (1971) for a detailed study of Cairo’s history.
4. The conference, entitled Cairo at a Turning Point, svas held at the Center for 
the Study of the Developing Countries, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt,
April 8-9, 1997.
5. A qism is an administrative unit linked to the Ministry of Interior through 
the police station. A shiakha is a small unit with a chief {sheikh al-hard), who 
is responsible for minor administrative tasks and who facilitates security.
